Abstract-In an IaaS cloud the physical infrastructure is controlled by service providers, including its security monitoring aspect. Clients hosting their information system are incited to trust the provider's claim (e.g. infrastructure availability) thanks to the assurance given by Service Level Agreements (SLAs). We aim at extending SLAs to include security monitoring terms. In this paper we describe the challenges to reach this goal, we propose a three-step incremental strategy and we apply the first step of this strategy on the case of network IDS (NIDS) monitoring probes. In this case study we select a relevant metric to describe the performance of an NIDS, that is the metric can figure in an SLA and can be measured to verify that the SLA is respected. In particular we propose an in situ verification method of such a metric on a production NIDS and evaluate experimentally and analytically the proposed method.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the introduction of cloud computing, organizations used to host their own computing resources (networks, servers, storage, applications, and services). Using clouds, organizations (called tenants) benefit from cost reduction (in both building and management) but they also face new problems in terms of security.
When moving to a cloud tenants lose full control of the information system infrastructure and must trust the service provider. The provider is in charge of monitoring the physical infrastructure and providing the required service to tenants.
However, as of today, service providers do not give assurance on the security monitoring of the hosted information systems. Our goal is to solve this issue.
Security Monitoring is the collection, analysis, and escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions [1] . Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and logs from firewalls are often used for this purpose. In particular Network IDSs (NIDS) monitor network traffic and generate alerts when potentially hostile traffic is detected [2] .
To build more trust, providers use Service Level Agreements (SLAs), which are contracts with each tenant to describe the provided service, the rights and obligations of both parties and penalties for when these terms are not respected. SLAs include Service Level Objectives (SLOs) describing the targeted quality of service using Key Performance Indicators (KPI).
In this paper we focus on SLAs and SLOs for Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) clouds. A core concept of IaaS clouds is sharing physical resources between independent users through virtualization. In this case we believe that the responsibility of monitoring the security has to be shared between the provider and the tenants. Effective security monitoring requires both the provider's visibility on the physical infrastructure and the tenant's knowledge of the services running.
We believe that mutual responsibility can be achieved through an SLA, which makes a trade-off between tenant's private information disclosed and the monitoring service offered. In this work each tenant provides the set of services to be monitored, allowing the provider to offer security monitoring SLOs with clear KPIs.
To achieve including security monitoring terms into SLAs, our approach divides the problem into sub-problems according to the SLA life cycle. In this paper we focus on the Verification phase of the SLA life cycle, in the case of NIDSs.
In this paper we present two contributions. First to decompose the problem of including security monitoring terms in IaaS cloud SLAs, we propose a three-step incremental strategy based on the SLA life cycle. Second to apply the first step of this strategy on the case of NIDS probes, we implement the Verification phase of the SLA life cycle by adapting an NIDS evaluation method using a new attack injection algorithm. We evaluate experimentally and analytically this verification method to show its feasibility in an IaaS production environment from the viewpoint of performance, usefulness and security.
In the rest of this paper, Section II presents related works, Section III details the problem and challenges to be addressed, Section IV describes our approach for SLA verification on the specific case of NIDSs, Section V presents an evaluation of the proposed method and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we present related work in three parts. First we briefly present Cloud SLAs and the closest approaches to define SLAs for security monitoring in clouds. In the next two parts we focus on NIDSs. We detail metrics that were defined to measure the quality of service of NIDSs and we present NIDS verification methods.
A. Cloud SLA and Security Monitoring
As an example of cloud SLA, Amazon cloud service (EC2) [3] offers an availability of more than 99.95%, and gives 10% service credit in return if this is not respected. This service credit becomes 30% if the availability is less than 99.0%. Previous works build security monitoring devices for a cloud [4] and define languages and frameworks to describe security SLAs [5] . The domain specific language proposed in [4] is too low-level to describe SLOs since it describes the detection algorithms of the IDS rather than Service-Level Objectives (SLO), for example a set of rules that can be negotiated before figuring in an SLA.
In [8] a high-level view of what security SLA terms should include is presented but no implementation is discussed. In [6] and in the SPECS project [7] frameworks are introduced to manage the security SLA life cycle (described in Section III). Besides the difference between guaranteeing security and assuring security monitoring, the SLOs introduced fail to describe the effectiveness of security devices.
To our knowledge, no previous work 1 defines security monitoring terms for SLAs. The difficulty is that SLA terms related to security monitoring need to be verifiable in the cloud setup. In this paper we propose a verification method for cloud security monitoring SLA terms concerning NIDSs.
B. NIDS Evaluation Metrics
To measure the effectiveness of an NIDS, the basic complementary metrics include True Positive (TP) and False Positive (FP) (resp. True Negative (TN) and False Negative (FN)). From these basic metrics the True Positive Rate (or detection rate) and False Positive Rate are calculated as = + and = + respectively. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves [10] correlate TPR and FPR and are used to graphically compare IDSs. But all the three metrics (TPR, FPR, and ROC) are impacted by the base rate fallacy problem [11] .
Base Rate: The base rate fallacy -which consists in neglecting prior probabilities when judging the probabilities of events -is studied in different fields of decision making [12] , [13] . For NIDSs the base rate is the probability = ( ) that a packet is part of an intrusion. Axelsson [11] described its effect on measuring the performance of IDSs.
It was found that in realistic production sites the base rate is close to zero. Gu et al [14] assumed base rates in the range of {1 × 10 −2 − 1 × 10 −6 }. In 1999 Axelsson [11] supposed that the maximum value was {2 × 10 −5 } (2 intrusions per day from 1, 000, 000 records, an intrusion affecting 10 records in average). In our experimental evaluation we use a base rate in the range of {1 × 10
Positive Predictive Value (PPV) and Negative Predictive Value (NPV):
= ( | ) and = (¬ | ¬ ) take the base rate into account but they are still two complementary metrics to measure the effectiveness of an IDS.
Intrusion Detection Capability (C ID ): Gu et al introduced the C ID metric in [14] . Let be the random variable representing the IDS input as either "attack" or "legitimate" packets (thus the base rate = ( = "attack")), the random variable representing the IDS output where a packet can be 1 The preliminary idea of this work was presented in [9] . detected as intrusive or non-intrusive, ( ) be the entropy of as defined in information theory, and ( ; ) the mutual information which measures the amount of information shared between the two random variables. The Intrusion Detection Capability (C ID ) is defined as:
The value of C ID ranges in [0, 1] and increases with the IDS ability in accurately classifying the input packets. This unified metric takes the base rate and other metrics into account.
C. Security Monitoring Setup Evaluation
To measure the effectiveness of an NIDS in a cloud environment, Probst et al. [15] describe a method in two phases: an analysis of network access control followed by the IDS evaluation in a cloned infrastructure based on the set of services running in the virtual infrastructure. Before this work, Massicotte et al. [16] used a virtual infrastructure to generate traffic traces and used the trace to evaluate IDSs hosted in physical servers. Both approaches inject attack traffic to measure the effectiveness of an NIDS, the former in a cloned given virtualized infrastructure and the latter as a generic product. However neither of them considers injecting a mix of realistic proportions of legitimate and attack traffic, which leads to the base rate fallacy issue (see Section II-B).
In this paper, to measure the effectiveness of an NIDS in an IaaS cloud, we keep the idea of injecting attack traffic and improve the relevance of the obtained measures by two means: we do not clone the production NIDS and the injected traffic is a mix of controlled proportions of legitimate and attack traffic.
III. PROBLEM DECOMPOSITION
In this section we detail and decompose the problem of defining cloud SLA terms for security monitoring. To validate this decomposition we study the specific case of NIDSs.
We identify four main challenges: 1) Virtualized infrastructures are dynamic and malleable, since creation, deletion and migration of VMs are automated and frequent. Security monitoring terms must anticipate such changes and the enforcement and verification of SLA terms (see below) must be automatic. 2) There is no standard to express precise security monitoring properties independently from the devices used. 3) To our knowledge, no method allows to automatically implement an abstract, tenant-defined, security monitoring policy on a set of security monitoring devices, where the policy implementation can be verified afterwards. 4) No methods evaluate full security monitoring setups in clouds. In this paper we present our work to address Challenges 1 and 4. The other challenges are left for future work.
If we set aside differences in terminology in [17] , [18] , [19] , we can summarize the main phases in an SLA life cycle as SLA Definition, Enforcement and Verification (see Figure 1) .
As a practical example, we present the SLA life cycle of the availability SLA terms offered by Amazon Web Services [3] . In the Definition phase, the provider writes an SLA template that includes SLOs and KPIs as follows: In the Enforcement phase, the provider deploys the service (here instantiating the requested VMs) at the appropriate time and on the requested location. After the service is deployed verifications can be done by both parties (provider and tenant) on the SLOs and in the event of SLA violation by the provider, tenants can claim the reward stated in the agreement.
To address the three phases of the SLA life-cycle for the case of security monitoring, we follow an incremental approach. First we choose appropriate metrics (KPIs) to define SLOs. For an NIDS, the KPIs should in particular quantify the NIDS effectiveness, that is its capability to detect harmful attacks. Second, we design verification mechanisms for security monitoring setups (see Section IV for an NIDS). This will give us insights in the expected efficiency and effectiveness of different strategies to setup security monitoring. Third, from these insights, we should derive heuristics for automatically computing security monitoring setups out of SLA terms.
IV. AN SLO VERIFICATION METHOD FOR NIDSS
In this section we propose a verification method that an IaaS cloud tenant can use to verify that SLOs for an NIDS are reached. We present first the threat model assumed, second the class of SLOs considered, third an architectural view of our method, and fourth how we compute the KPIs of the SLOs.
A. Threat Model
We consider only software attacks, that originate from tenant input to the cloud API, from virtual machines (VMs), or from outside the cloud. The cloud provider is assumed honest and its infrastructure safe against attacks. In particular no low-level network attack can compromise virtual switches, since traffic from outside the cloud arrives as IP packets that are routed towards the VMs by an edge router, and traffic from VMs is encapsulated in virtual LANs.
It is important to note that the negotiation of SLAs can only cover known types of attacks, because service providers may not commit for unknown types of attacks. However the list of monitored attacks can be regularly updated.
Note that although the provider is assumed honest, SLAs need to be verified because a violation may be unintended and result from provider-implemented heuristics being imperfect. 
B. Class of SLOs Considered
In the SLA definition phase, the provider and tenants set lists of services to be monitored, lists of known attacks (normal behaviors of production traffic in the case of anomaly-based IDSs) and the expected effectiveness of NIDSs described with the C ID metric. These lists of attacks are the intersections of users requirements and security monitoring services available. Only these attacks can be used for verification purposes.
Attacks are listed with details about the type of tenant service they are targeting, as well as the software and its version implementing the tenant service.
We choose the C ID metric as KPI to describe the effectiveness of an NIDS as C ID supersedes other commonly used metrics and depends on the base rate. Note that our method is also valid for other metrics derived from TP and FP.
An example of SLO considered is composed of the vulnerabilities presented in Table I , and a C ID value of at least 0.9 for a base rate = 10 −2 . The chosen categories of attacks represent a large section of network attacks [20] . Note that the target C ID value in such an SLO depends on some base rate. In this example the base rate is too high to be realistic, but is suitable for verification purposes (see Section V-B).
Finally, note that the formal definition of such security monitoring SLOs which includes choosing an appropriate, verifiable C ID value to obtain an effective, real C ID value (with a realistic base rate) is planned for future work.
C. Architecture
The verification mechanism performs attack campaigns against a given configuration without damaging the production environment. An example of the attack running setup is shown in Figure 2 . The production environment is composed of tenant Virtual Machines (VM1, VM2, and VM3), hosted on cloud compute nodes (physical servers), and connected to virtual switches. An NIDS analyzes all network packets flowing through the virtual switches using mirroring ports.
We extend this infrastructure with three components: 1) an Attack Injector injects traffic, mixing attacks and legitimate requests, to be analyzed by the NIDS; 2) a Target Virtual Machine ("Cloned Victim" in Figure 2) , to which the injected traffic is redirected, exhibits the network behavior of the production VMs; 3) a Metrics Evaluator (see Figure 3 ) computes the KPIs, using the injected traffic and the NIDS output.
1) Attack Injector:
The Attack Injector is a physical or virtual machine located inside or outside of the cloud network and it is used to simulate an attacker. The Attack Injector must be able to reach the Target VM. The switch is configured to forward all incoming packets from the Attack Injector to the Target VM. Hence, injected attacks should not affect services running on production VMs.
As shown in Section II-B, KPI values highly depend on the base rate during the verification phase. However, in real production environments the base rate is likely to be very low and impossible to know. Hence, the base rate used in the verification phase should be based on trade-offs between statistically observed data (see Section II-B), performance (see Section V-B), and accuracy when inferring KPI values based on a realistic base rate from verified values.
The novelty of the traffic injection algorithm we propose is to dynamically control the base rate. The algorithm takes three inputs: a set of attacks, a set of legitimate requests, and a target base rate. The base rate is dynamically controlled using the knowledge of the number of packets sent by each attack and each legitimate request. The algorithm runs two loops in parallel that randomly select and inject an attack (resp. a legitimate request) with randomly distributed inter-arrival times. The attacks and legitimate requests inter-arrival time distributions are selected to achieve the target base rate.
2) Target VM: The Target VM is used to simulate the behavior of production VMs (services running in the production VMs). Multiple target VMs could be used in case a single VM is unable to exhibit all the required behaviors. In this SLA verification process we are interested in the network behavior of an application. Any mechanism that can simulate the network behavior of an application could be used in our methodology. In [15] an automaton is used to model network exchanges of an application with a legitimate and a malicious user. More realistic simulations produce more accurate results. One way to perform this is to run the same applications as in the production VMs.
3) Metrics Evaluator: The packets exchanged between the Attack Injector and the Target VM are logged (dumped) before reaching the NIDS. This log and the output of the NIDS are then used to compute the KPIs.
D. KPI Computation
At this stage, we have a predefined set of attacks, the base rate, dumped packets from the communications between the Attack Injector and the Target VM and the output of the NIDS. Using this information we compute the C ID metric of the NIDS. Figure 3 shows the architecture of the Metrics Evaluator. The goals are to see whether the NIDS detected We have to match packets associated to alerts in the NIDS output with packets from the communications between the Attack Injector and the Target VM. The output of an NIDS is a set of events which are triggered when packets match at least one rule in the NIDS rule set or when the monitored traffic exhibits an abnormal behavior in the case of anomaly-based NIDSs. An event includes an event ID, source and destination IPs and ports, a time stamp, a set of packets which triggered the event and (if applicable) the rule which generated the event.
The computation starts by reconstructing sessions from the dumped set of packets. Then sessions are categorized into legitimate and attack sessions. This categorization is based on the knowledge about the injected packets. Then packets from the events are mapped to these sessions to get the values of TP and FP. Note that the verification method does not depend on the NIDS software used. Our method can be adapted to different types of NIDS by adapting the parser of the NIDS output. We now detail each metrics computation step.
• Dumping Packets: The NIDS is connected to a location where it is able to see every packet passing through the monitored environment. Dumping on such a link allows to see all packets entering in the NIDS. As we only want to reconstruct sessions between the Attack Injector and the Target VM, we use filters to separate those packets.
• Session Reconstruction: The output from the previous step is a list of packets. In order to differentiate between legitimate and attack packets from this list we re-assemble the packets in network sessions, which are easier to match with the traffic that is injected.
• Session Categorization: Once the packets are assembled into sessions, using our prior knowledge about the injected traffic, we can categorize them into their respective types. To this end, since we know the requests prior to injection, we use some of their characteristic attributes like port numbers used, packet payload and number of packets per session.
• Packet Mapping: This is the last step before doing the actual metrics computation. Packets from the NIDS output are mapped to the sessions from the previous step. If a packet matches with an attack session it indicates that the IDS detected that attack. On the other hand if it maps to a legitimate session, the NIDS issued a false positive. From this we can calculate the different metrics described in Section II-B, including the C ID . 
V. EVALUATION
This section presents an evaluation of the verification method proposed in Section IV. It is composed of an experimental study of its performance impact on production VMs, and a correctness, usefulness and security analysis.
A. Experimental Setup
We setup the environment shown in Figure 2 on the Grid'5000 [21] testbed. Each node had 2 Intel Xeon X5570 CPUs (6M cache, 2.93 GHz, 4 cores) and 24GB RAM. The 2 nodes cloud infrastructure was based on OpenStack [22] and Open vSwitch [23] . The Snort [2] NIDS ran on a third node and was connected to the Open vSwitch mirroring ports through Generic Routing Encapsulation tunnels. The Attack Injector ran on a fourth node outside the cloud network.
Three production VMs ran respectively a web server, a database server and a content management server. We added a Target VM that exhibits the behavior of the other VMs by running all three services. All VMs ran Ubuntu server 14.04 with the OpenStack m1.medium flavor (2 VCPUs, 4GB memory and 40GB disk). We used tcpdump on the NIDS node with filters to dump only the packets from communications between the Attack Injector and the Target VM. We used tcpflow to perform session reconstruction.
For this evaluation we used the example SLO presented in Section IV-B. To this end we collected the vulnerable applications and collected and/or developed the attacks listed with their corresponding Snort rules to detect them. We also prepared a set of legitimate requests to be injected in parallel with attacks as described in Section IV-C.
B. Performance Impact
Since our SLA verification method runs in the production network infrastructure but does not involve production VMs, the most expected performance impact is network overhead.
The network overhead is measured as the difference in response time of a given request to a production VM with and without SLA verification running in parallel. To measure this overhead, a first experiment started by simulating production traffic at time 0 . The SLA verification started later at time 1 and finished at time 2 . The production traffic then continued until time 3 ( 0 < 1 < 2 < 3 ). This way we can compare the response time in different phases. This experiment was performed using base rate values = 10 −2 and = 10 −3 . Table II shows the average number of attacks and legitimate requests injected over ten rounds using = 10 −2 . For this experiment both attack and legitimate request injectors used three processes each to send interlaced verification traffic. The box plot in Figure 4 shows the mean response time for each type of legitimate request in the three time intervals: "Before" verification, "At verification", and "After" it is finished. The plot shows that the overhead is very small relative to the time needed for a request. We observe a maximum overhead of 6.9% (0.000165 second) in the case of "SQL Login" requests and a minimum of 2.2% (0.001755 second) in the case of "WordPress Login" requests (see Figure 5 ). For "WordPress Login" requests we can notice with the "After" box plot that the response time increases during the experiment even without verification. Overall in this experiment, the most observable impact of verification seems to be an increased dispersion of response times.
Another important factor while performing verification is the base rate. It determines the time required for verification. The experiment to produce the graph shown in Figure 4 took 41.6 minutes using a base rate = 10 −2 . We also did an experiment with = 10 −3 , which showed the same overhead but took a much longer time (around 4 hours). This duration is expected because as the base rate decreases, the rate of attack injection declines and it requires a longer time to get enough attack samples to compute accurate statistics.
Decreasing verification time is possible by increasing both the attack and legitimate traffic injection rate but the overhead in the production environment will increase. Figure 5 shows the time needed in further experiments to perform verification using different traffic injection rate. The injection rate can be altered by increasing (decreasing) the number of parallel processes. We performed three experiments using respectively 3, 12 and 30 processes for both attack and legitimate traffic. It took 41.6, 12.5 and 2.45 minutes respectively, while the overhead increases for each case respectively. In other terms there is a trade-off between the time required to perform the verification and the overhead on the production environment.
C. Correctness, Usefulness and Security Analysis
In this section, we first show the correctness of our verification process, then its usefulness from tenants and providers perspective and finally we present a detailed security analysis.
1) Correctness Analysis:
To show the correctness of our verification process, we first manually compute the expected C ID value using knowledge from the NIDS configuration, then we run the verification mechanism and check if the result matches the expected value. In the experiment Snort is configured with 49 rules to detect the attacks listed in Table II . The table also lists the actual number of attacks and legitimate requests injected in our experiment using base rate = 10 −2 . We expect Snort to give alerts for almost all true attacks and very few (close to zero) false positives. This results from carefully crafted rules in the experiment setup, which simulates a real production environment. It should be noted that, in a real production environment, achieving such a low false positive rate is difficult. In our experiment we observed an average packet drop rate from Snort of 2.95% over ten rounds. Consequently, we expect false negatives (FNR ≈ 0.03) as some attack packets are likely not processed by Snort. As a result the expected C ID value should be around 0.95.
Using the data in Table II , the output of Snort and the packets recorded from the attack campaign, we computed the C ID value as shown in Figure 3 . As expected the metric evaluator outputs ≈ 1.0 and ≈ 0, i.e. all processed attacks are detected and no false alarm is generated. We have FNR ≈ 0.07 and C ID ≈ 0.90. In our experimentation environment the metrics evaluator thus shows a very small and acceptable difference from the expected value. 2) Usefulness Analysis: Having such a transparent SLA verification mechanism is useful for both service providers and tenants. Tenants should trust more services they consume as such SLAs guarantee compensation in case of SLO violation. For providers, in addition to increasing their clients trust, providing guaranteed security monitoring service should give economic advantage either directly by providing a paid service model or indirectly by attracting new customers, who were previously not confident enough with the security of clouds.
3) Security Analysis: The Target VM is the only component changing the production environment. It is carefully prepared to simulate the behavior of production VMs and is targeted only by attacks which are detected by the NIDS, i.e. undetectable attacks (e.g cross-VM side-channel [24] and IDS evasions [25] ) should not be injected in this method.
The metrics evaluation phase could be disrupted by changing the output of tcpdump, either by maliciously adding content (e.g. by spoofing the IP address of the Attack Injector) or because of packet loss. Similarly occurrences of malicious attacks targeting the NIDS [25] would change the NIDS output. The most idle the environment is the better for verification.
Injected attacks are no real threats because the virtual switch is configured to forward all incoming packets from the Attack Injector to the Target VM, which guarantees that injected packets do not reach production VMs. This configuration requires cooperation with providers since tenants should have no direct control on a shared switch. An economic advantage could incite providers for such cooperation. Tcpflow reconstructs sessions from the output of tcpdump, but it does not handle IP fragments. In cases where the NIDS and tcpflow use different IP fragments handling strategy, the reconstruction phase would also be altered. Thus attacks exploiting IP fragmentation could lead to errors in the packet mapping phase. Wireshark [27] could resolve this issue.
External TCP sessions (packets not from/to the Attack Injector and the Target VM) in the tcpdump output are not categorized. Getting a higher percentage of such sessions would imply poor filtering and/or reconstruction and it could lead to a false result. In such cases the verifier should observe and decide whether to continue or redo the previous steps.
Finally, to get such SLA terms, tenants are required to provide lists of services to be monitored. This disclosure of services should not be a security concern because, as the provider is assumed trustworthy, the confidentiality of this information should be respected. Moreover the method does not use the actual data processed by the services.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we tackled the problem of including security monitoring terms in IaaS cloud SLAs. We presented two contributions. First to decompose the problem we proposed a three-step incremental strategy based on the SLA life cycle. Second to apply the first step of this strategy on the case of NIDS probes, we adapted an NIDS evaluation method to implement the Verification phase of the SLA life cycle. We evaluated experimentally and analytically this method to show its feasibility in an IaaS production environment from the viewpoint of performance, usefulness and security.
As a result first we studied state-of-the-art IDS evaluation metrics and we chose the C ID as a usable KPI in SLOs to describe the effectiveness of an NIDS because it takes the base rate into account and supersedes traditionally used metrics.
Second we proposed an SLO in situ verification method to measure the C ID of an NIDS dynamically using traffic injection. The novelty of our verification method is to improve the relevance of the obtained measures by two means: for the sake of trust we do not clone the production NIDS, and the base rate of the injected traffic is dynamically controlled. The experimental evaluation shows that during verification phases of 40 minutes a reasonable overhead (less than 10%) can be observed on production VMs response times. This overhead could be decreased at the price of longer verification phases.
In future work we will study how to choose verifiable C ID values and add other metrics to describe the NIDS configuration compliance to users' requirements in SLOs. We also plan to extend this approach to other monitoring probes (e.g. firewalls). We will then study heuristics to automatically configure the security monitoring according to SLOs.
